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Abstract:  This paper uses duration analysis to investigate factors influencing 
starting and quitting smoking, in particular the role of tobacco taxes.  Applying 
a variety of parametric duration models, including a split population model, to 
a sample of Irish women, it finds mixed results regarding the effect of tobacco 
taxes.  In general the coefficient on tobacco taxes is in the expected direction 
but in some cases statistical significance is low.  The paper finds among other 
factors education, health knowledge and marital status to be most important 
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There is ample medical evidence indicating the adverse effects of tobacco 
consumption upon health (see Madden, 2001a, for a recent summary).  Recent 
Government publications in Ireland have suggested the long-term goal of a ￿tobacco-
free society￿.  As the accompanying letter to a recent Government report stated: 
￿￿there is a common objective of seeking the most effective measures possible to 
dramatically reduce the level of smoking in our society and above all to prevent our 
children from starting to smoke￿ (Mooney, 2000).  It follows that identifying the 
factors behind the decision to smoke and the decision to quit is crucial in terms of 
formulating policy. 
A recent paper examined the factors influencing participation in smoking, the 
amount smoked and factors influencing quitting for a sample of Irish women 
(Madden, 2001).  However, one factor absent from that work was the influence of a 
crucially important tool of government policy in its drive towards a tobacco-free 
society, the rate of taxation on tobacco and tobacco products.   The data in Madden 
(2001) was a single cross-section of Irish women and the absence of any variation in 
tax or price meant that it was impossible to infer the effect of these variables on 
smoking behaviour.  The dataset however did include some retrospective data on the 
year of quitting smoking (for those women who quit) and also the number of years 
smoking (from which could be inferred the year of starting smoking).  Using this data, 
and incorporating the relevant tax rate for the year in question, it is possible to 
construct a longitudinal data set with the tax rate as a time-varying covariate.   
Following this it is then possible to model the decision to start/quit smoking as either 
a binary choice or to model the duration before starting/quitting.  We adopt the 
duration analysis approach in this paper.  For duration modelling in the case of 
starting we use the split-population duration model of Schmidt and Witte (1989), 
Douglas and Harihan (1994) and Foster and Jones (2000) while for quitting we follow 
the approach of Tauras and Chaloupka (1999) and Foster and Jones (2000) in 
applying standard parametric models. 
Note that we are not trying to estimate what the optimal tax on tobacco should be.  
For a comprehensive recent survey dealing with the US, see Evans et al (1999).  The  3 
key issues in this literature appears to be (a) which external costs should be included 
in the social cost of tobacco consumption, in particular whether the costs of maternal 
smoking (in terms of the health costs of low-weight babies, sudden infant death 
syndrome etc) should be included and (b) assumptions regarding the time consistency 
of preferences.  Gruber (2001), Gruber and K￿szegi (2001) and Laux (2000) indicate 
that if preferences are not assumed to be time consistent then the internal cost of 
smoking should also be included in the social cost of smoking.  This would imply 
huge tax increases over current levels.  There is very little treatment of the optimal 
tobacco tax for Ireland but see Madden (1992) for an approach which attempts to infer 
the degree of consumption externality implicit in existing taxes. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we briefly discuss some of 
the existing literature and in section 3 we outline a simple model of starting and 
quitting smoking.   In section 4 we discuss our data and describe and present results 
from our empirical model while section 5 provides concluding comments. 
 
2.  Review of Literature
1 
It was believed at one time that cigarette smoking and other addictive behaviour 
was not rational and so not suitable for conventional economic analysis (e.g. 
Schelling, 1984).  There is now however a substantial body of literature to testify that 
the demand for cigarettes clearly responds to changes in prices and other factors.  
Early studies of cigarette demand employed aggregate time-series data and produced 
estimates of the price elasticity of demand in the region of ￿0.4.  One disadvantage of 
these studies was that they were unable to distinguish between the elasticity of 
cigarette demand conditional upon smoking and the elasticity of participation.  Later 
studies used the type of individual level data employed in this study.  These studies 
are able to consider separately the effect of price on the probability of smoking and on 
average consumption of smokers.  Furthermore, studies on the probability of smoking 
can be divided into those which view starting and quitting as binary events within a 
discrete choice framework and those which use duration analysis.  For an example of 
an application of the former approach to the dataset used in this paper see Madden 
(2001a).  However this paper only examined a single cross-section and so could not 
incorporate time series variation in price or tax data.  As we will see below it is 
                                                 
1 The first part of this section draws upon the excellent survey by Chaloupka and Warner (1999).  4 
possible to expand this framework and extend the binary choice framework to include 
the effects of taxes/prices.
2 
Studies which have examined smoking initiation in a discrete choice framework 
have typically estimated elasticities of participation with respect to tax in the region of 
￿0.5 to ￿1.0 with an apparent inverse relationship between age and smoking elasticity 
(for a summary see Chaloupka and Warner, 1999).  There are fewer applications of 
duration analysis.  Douglas and Harihan (1994) use a split population model to 
analyse starting smoking.  They find no evidence of a statistically significant price 
effect.  Douglas (1998) analysed the hazards of starting and quitting, once again using 
a split population model, but this time with an ordered probit, which distinguishes 
between those who never start smoking, those who start and quit and those who start 
but do not quit.  The ￿delay￿ before starting and quitting are modelled using a log-
logistic and Weibull specification respectively.  The price of cigarettes is included as 
a time-varying covariate.  The price of cigarettes has no significant effect upon the 
hazard of starting smoking but the number of years an individual smokes has an 
approximately unitary elasticity with respect to price.  Forster and Jones (2000) 
analyse retrospective UK data with a split population model for starting smoking and 
a variety of parametric duration models for quitting.  They find a tax elasticity of the 
age of starting smoking of +0.16 for men and +0.08 for women.  The estimates of the 
tax elasticity of quitting are ￿0.6 for men and ￿0.46 for women.  They also include a 
variety of specification tests and find their estimates to be quite robust. 
We complete this section by briefly reviewing the existing Irish studies on tobacco 
consumption.  A variety of models of tobacco consumption have been estimated 
mostly using aggregate time-series data for Ireland dating from O￿Riordan (1969) to 
Madden (1993).
3  These studies have produced broadly comparable results with a 
median estimate for the price elasticity of tobacco in the region of ￿0.5, which is in 
line with results from elsewhere in the world.  The use of aggregate time-series data 
precludes distinguishing between the effect of price on the probability of smoking and 
on the demand for cigarettes conditional on smoking.  Conniffe (1995) remedies this 
to some extent by combining analysis of aggregate time-series data with data on the 
proportion of the total population who are smokers.  He found that the proportion of 
                                                 
2 In a companion paper to the current one, Madden (2001b) estimates the effect of taxes using a 
discrete choice approach. 
3 The exception was O￿Riordan (1969) who used data from the Tobacco Research Council.  5 
the population smoking is unaffected by price (or income) but exhibits a downward 
trend related to health concerns.  Consumption by smokers does not exhibit such a 
downward trend but appears to have a significant price elasticity of around ￿0.3. 
We now turn to outline the simple model of starting and quitting smoking which 
underlies our analysis. 
 
3.  A Model of Starting and Quitting Smoking 
In this section we outline a simple theoretical model which underlies our 
empirical approach.  The model draws on the exposition of Douglas and Harihan 
(1994).  Suppose each individual has a concave utility function at time t 
) , , , ( t t t t t L S Y C U U =  
where  t C is the level of consumption of the addictive good whose price is  t P ,  t Y is 
consumption of a non-addictive numeraire good whose price is unity,  t S is the stock 
of accumulated addiction capital and  t L represents other demographic/life cycle 
variables which may affect utility. 
  The stock of addictive capital  t S  depreciates at rate γ but it is replenished by 
current consumption of the addictive good  t C so that 
t t t C S S + − = + ) 1 ( 1 γ . 
Since the individual starts off with zero units of consumption  0 0 = S . 
  Assume that each individual is infinitely lived, then discounted remaining 












where ρ is the rate of time preference. 
  The lifetime budget constraint is determined by the present value of lifetime 
wealth  t A , the present value of lifetime expenditure on the numeraire good Y  and 
the present value of lifetime expenditure on the addictive good C at prices  t P .  We 
make the simplifying assumption that lifetime earnings are not affected by the stock 
of addiction.
4  The budget constraint for the individual at time t is  
                                                 
4 There is some controversy as to the effect of the consumption of addictive goods on wages.  Clearly 
























where  i I is income at time i and r is the rate of interest.  We can now look at the 
decisions to start and quit smoking.  Dealing with starting first, a rational individual 
will begin smoking if the marginal benefit of the first cigarette exceeds its marginal 
cost i.e. 
) 0 | , , ( ) 0 | , , ( = > = t t t t C t t t t C S L Y C MC S L Y C MB  
where  C MB is the marginal discounted remaining lifetime benefit of cigarette 
consumption while  C MC is the marginal discounted remaining lifetime cost.  It seems 
likely that some of the variables affecting marginal cost and benefit will have a 
stochastic component.  For example, they could both be affected by the occurrence of 
respiratory illnesses which would reduce the appeal of smoking or they could be 
influenced by the number of smokers in the potential smoker￿s peer group.  So the 
above condition could be re-specified along the lines: 
t t t t MC MB µ ε + > +
* *  
where  )} 0 | , , ( {
* = ≡ t t t t C t S L Y C MB E MB  and  )} 0 | , , ( {
* = = t t t t C t S L Y C MC E MC . 
  Thus the probability of staring smoking at time t given that an individual has 
not started smoking in a previous period is 
)} 0 | , , (( ) 0 | , , ( Pr{ } 0 | 0 Pr{ = > = = = > t t t t C t t t t C t t S L Y C MC S L Y C MB S C  
} Pr{
* *
t t t t MB MC − > − = µ ε . 
  ) ( ) (
* * t H MB MC H t t = − =  
where  ) (t H is a hazard function based on the distribution  Pr{ ) ( = T F Start Smoking at 
} T t ≤ .   ) (t H  will be decreasing in 
* *
t t MB MC − .  In this case the hazard function is 
the conditional probability that a person will smoke in period t given that he has not 
smoked up to and including period t-1. 
  The analysis of quitting is very similar, except of course that marginal cost and 
benefit are now conditional upon a stock of accumulated addictive capital.  A person 
will quit in period T if the following condition holds: 
) 0 | , , ( ) 0 | , , (
1 1
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moderate alcohol consumption has a positive effect upon wages but that tobacco use reduces wages.  










 reflects the stock of accumulated addictive capital up to period T and 
the person started smoking in period τ.  Note that this assumes a single spell of 
smoking ￿ we do not allow for multiple spells of smoking, not smoking, smoking 
again etc.  Then, following the analysis above, the probability that someone will quit 
smoking in period T, given that they were smoking in period T-1 is  
} Pr{ } 0 , 0 | 0 Pr{
* *
1
1 T T T T
T
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In this case  ) (T H  is increasing in 
* *
T T MB MC − . 
  
4.  Data and Empirical Model 
In this section we discuss our data and the empirical model adopted.  Our data 
comes from a survey known as the Saffron Survey  which was carried out in 1998 by 
the Centre for Health Economics at University College Dublin.
5  The Saffron 
Survey￿s aim was to survey women￿s knowledge, understanding and awareness of 
their lifetime health needs.  Much of the focus of the survey was on the issue of 
hormone replacement therapy
6 but other information regarding health, lifestyle 
choices and demographics was also collected.  For our purposes in this paper the 
relevant questions regarding smoking were as follows: ￿ Do you currently smoke?￿.  
People who answered ￿yes￿ to this question were then asked ￿For approximately how 
many years have you smoked?￿.  People who replied that they did not currently 
smoked were asked had they ever smoked and if they answered yes to this question 
they too were asked for approximately how many years they had smoked, and in what 
year they had stopped smoking.  From the answers to these questions it is possible to 
calculate the years people started (and stopped if applicable) smoking.  The great 
advantage of this type of information is that it is possible to examine the effect of the 
tax rate in each given year on the probability of starting/quitting smoking. 
One problem which potentially arises in this analysis is the use of the word 
￿approximately￿ in the question regarding the duration of smoking.  There is a danger 
here of ￿heaping￿ in the sense that people will round off their answer to this question 
                                                 
5 I am grateful to Joe Durkan and the Centre for Health Economics for supplying this data. 
6 See Thompson, 2000.  8 
to the nearest 5/10 years.  There are a variety of techniques of addressing this issue 
(see Torelli and Trivellato, 1993, for a comprehensive discussion) but here we adopt 
the ad hoc approach of simply including dummy variables for the years where 
heaping is likely (viz. five, ten, fifteen and twenty years before the date of the survey). 
Before the formal analysis it is useful to look at some summary information on 
our sample.  The original sample size for the Saffron survey was 1260.  However, 
since we only have tax and price data going back as far as 1960, we have dropped all 
women who were aged 10 or more in 1960.  We are effectively assuming that subjects 
were at risk of starting smoking from the age of ten.  Our data suggests that this is a 
reasonable assumption since the number of subjects who reported starting smoking 
before ten was miniscule.  Thus we only have women who were born after 1950, 
leaving us with a total sample of just over 700.  Of these, about half have smoked at 
some stage of their lives and about 35 per cent were smoking at time of interview.  In 
table 1 we give summary statistics (with standard errors in brackets) for a number of 
key variables for the various subgroups in our sample. 
There is relatively little difference across the groups by age except for ex-smokers 
who tend to be older.  As might be expected this group also tends to have worse 
health (which perhaps prompted them to quit smoking).  They also show a higher 
proportion of married, which may reflect people giving up smoking on getting 
married.  Probably the biggest difference across the columns is to be observed in 
educational attainment.  Of the total population (including smokers) over 60 per cent 
have obtained Leaving Cert or higher, but of those who have ever smoked only about 
47 per cent have.  This drops to about 44 per cent when we examine those people still 
smoking in 1998.  Thus getting beyond Junior Cert appears to not only lower the 
chances of starting smoking, but also increases the chances of quitting if you do start 
to smoke. 
As explained above, the Saffron survey was a cross-section survey carried out in 
1998.  However, we are exploiting the retrospective information which enables us to 
examine the impact of a time-varying covariate such as tax or price on the decision to 
start/quit smoking.  One issue which must first be discussed in the choice of tax/price.  
The choice of such a variable is motivated by the theory of consumer demand which 
suggests that the quantity consumed (or in this case the decision to consume) will be 
influenced by a number of factors, including the consumer price (which in turn is 
influenced by the tax on tobacco).  9 
The tax element in the retail price of a packet of cigarettes has two components, 
excise duty and value-added tax (VAT).  Thus excise duty is added to the producer 
price and VAT is then applied at the appropriate rate to obtain the retail price.  While 
the retail price is thus influenced by two tax instruments (the rate of excise duty and 
VAT) it is arguable that only excise duty can be regarded as a specific tax instrument 
to address smoking, since any increase in the rate of VAT will also cause the prices of 
many other goods to rise.  To engineer a rise in the relative price of tobacco, a rise in 
excise duty is appropriate.  Unfortunately the data supplied to us by the Revenue 
Commissioners does not break down the tax component into excise and VAT for the 
period up to 1973.  Thus we have taken the total tax component of the retail price and 
deflated it by the personal consumption deflator to arrive at a real tax on tobacco.  
This sidesteps the need for such a breakdown since any excise tax increase in excess 
of overall inflation will appear as an increase in the real tax whereas increases in VAT 
will also be reflected in increases in the overall price level and thus contribute less to 
any increase in the real tax. 
We thus have a choice between using the real tax content or the consumer price as 
the relevant time-varying covariate.  It can be argued that from the point of view of 
the decision which the consumer makes re starting or quitting it is the consumer price 
which is relevant.  On the other hand, from the point of view of government it is the 
tax content which is the policy variable.  However, from a practical point of view, the 
choice between them is largely irrelevant.  As figure 1 below shows, the two series 
move pretty much in tandem and the correlation coefficient between them is 0.97. 
We now turn to discuss the more formal analysis of starting and quitting, dealing 
with starting first.  
 
4.1  Starting Smoking 
To analyse the decisions to start/quit smoking, we employ duration analysis, with 
the extra proviso that when examining the decision to start smoking we employ a split 
population model.  When modelling the decision to smoke, we include as one of our 
covariates the tax rate for the year in question.  Thus say we observe woman A, aged 
40 in 1998 (the year of the survey) who commenced smoking aged 20 (i.e. in 1978).  
We assume people are at risk of starting smoking from the age of ten (1968 in the 
case of woman A).  Thus we will have ten observations on woman A where she does 
not smoke, followed by the transition in year 11 where she does smoke.  Each  10 
observation for each year for this woman (up to when she starts smoking) is regarded 
as a separate observation.  Thus the observation for 1968 for woman A has a duration 
of one, with the tax rate for 1968 as one of the covariates and is regarded as right-
censored.  The observation for 1969 for woman A has a duration of 2, is still right-
censored and has the tax rate for 1969 as a covariate.  This continues up to the 
observation for 1978 where there is a ￿failure￿ or transition to smoking. 
Consider now the case of woman B with the same age as woman A but who has 
not started smoking by 1998.  In this case there are thirty observations for woman B, 
all of them right-censored.  No ￿failure￿ or transition to smoking is observed.   
Standard duration models assume that failure will eventually take place.  Thus even if 
the last observation for an individual is right-censored (i.e. in our case they have not 
started smoking by 1998) it is assumed that at some stage they will start smoking.  If, 
say, we were trying to model the duration of a light bulb then this assumption is 
realistic.  At some stage the light bulb will fail.  But the assumption is not realistic for 
the case of starting smoking, since a substantial proportion of the population never 
smoke at any stage of their lives.  In this case a split population model is appropriate 
where the likelihood of each observation is weighted by the probability that the 
individual will ever start to smoke and so the duration analysis is applied only to those 
individuals predicted to start smoking. 
It is also possible to estimate standard duration models where the population is not 
split.  We present estimates for both models below.  
Before discussing the appropriate parametric duration model we first present the  
plot of the empirical hazard function below.  This is particularly useful when choosing 
a parametric hazard function.  We use the lifetable estimate of the hazard function 
(with confidence intervals as shown) and this is qualitatively very similar to the 
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This figure shows that the hazard increases at first and then decreases.  It reaches 
its peak when the time period equals seven, which corresponds to age seventeen since 
we assume subjects are at risk of smoking from age ten.  There is another local peak 
at age twenty-one and then a fairly sharp decrease.  What this suggests is that a 
monotonic hazard function is not appropriate for this dataset.  A hazard function 
which at first increases and then decreases seems most appropriate, suggesting the 
log-logistic model is worth trying. 
For the smokers in our sample we infer the age of starting as outlined above and 
the duration data can be viewed as a complete spell.  The sample, of course, also 
contains individuals who are not observed to have started smoking.  A parametric 
duration model would interpret these individuals as incomplete spells and assume that 
they will eventually fail and start smoking.  They are viewed as ￿right-censored￿ at 
the time of the survey.  As explained above this does not appear reasonable when 
dealing with smoking and consequently Douglas and Harihan (1994) in their analysis 
of US data and Foster and Jones (2000) in their analysis of UK data have argued that 
a split population model be used.  In this model duration analysis is applied only to 
those individuals who are predicted to eventually start smoking. 
Following Foster and Jones (2000) suppose we define  1 = s  for an individual who 
will eventually start smoking and modelling eventual failure (i.e. starting smoking) 
using a probit specification we have 
  ) ( ) 1 Pr( i z s α ′ Φ = =  and  ) ( 1 ) 0 Pr( i z s α ′ Φ − = =  
where  i z  is a vector of time invariant covariates, Φ  is the cumulative density 
function for the standard normal distribution and α  is a parameter vector.  Thus the  12 
probability of starting smoking at a given time t is defined conditional upon 
eventually starting. 
  Given the plot of the empirical hazard function above the most appropriate 
parametric duration model is the log-logistic.  The probability density function  (.) f  
and the survival function  (.) S  of the log-logistic distribution for those individuals who 
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where  )) ( exp( t x i β λ ′ − = ,  ) (t x i  is a vector of time variant and time-invariant 
covariates and γ  is a scale parameter. 
  Then the contribution to the log-likelihood function for the split population 
model becomes, for individual i: 
))] ( ; 1 | ( ) ( ) ( 1 ln[ ) 1 ( ))] ( ; 1 | ( ) ( ln[ t x s t S z z c t x s t f z c i i i i i i i = ′ Φ + ′ Φ − − + = ′ Φ α α α  
For those who are observed as smokers in the sample,  1 = i c  and their contribution to 
the likelihood function is simply the log of the probability of being a smoker ) ( i z α ′ Φ  
times the probability density function of starting at the observed starting age,  (.) f .  
For those who are observed as not starting ( 0 = i c ), the contribution is the log of the 
probability of never starting  ) ( 1 i z α ′ Φ −  plus the probability of starting after the age 
observed at the time of the survey,  (.) ) ( S z i α ′ Φ . 
  We also estimate a version where the population is not split and we employ 
the log-logistic model. 
  In table 2 we present estimates of the above split population model and in 
table 3 we present estimates of the log-logistic model where the population is not 
split.  We include both time-varying and non-time-varying covariates in these models.  
Education is frequently regarded as an important determinant of health and smoking 
habits (see Meara, 2000) and we include categorical variables for Junior Certificate 
(essentially leaving formal education at around sixteen years of age), Leaving 
Certificate (where the secondary cycle is completed and education ceases at about  13 
eighteen years of age) and third level. The default category is Primary Education 
whereby formal schooling ends at about twelve years of age.   
  The mechanism whereby education affects smoking behaviour is unclear.  It 
may indicate that more educated people simply have more information regarding the 
effects of smoking upon health.  It may also indicate that more educated people are 
better able to process or act upon information on regarding the health effects of 
smoking.  Finally it may reflect the presence of a ￿third￿ variable whereby which 
simultaneously influences attitudes towards both education and smoking/health.  Thus 
individuals with a low discount rate  (i.e. they are more ￿future-oriented￿) will invest 
in both their health capital (by refraining from activities such as smoking) and their 
human capital.  While we do include a measure of health knowledge (see below) in 
the absence of reliable measures of such discount rates it is difficult to distinguish 
between these different mechanisms but it is likely that all three (and perhaps others) 
are at work.
7 
  To try and capture the influence of government campaigns to deter smoking 
we also include dummy variables for both the TV and radio bans on tobacco 
advertising.  We also include a variable which we label health knowledge.  As 
mentioned above, the Saffron survey collected a variety of information regarding the 
health habits and needs of women.  Owing to its concentration on hormone 
replacement therapy, a number of questions were asked regarding  health knowledge 
in this area.  As our measure of health knowledge we include a dummy variable which 
measures the response to the question ￿Have you ever heard of osteoporosis?￿.
 8  
Clearly this question refers to a dimension of health which differs from smoking, but 
we do not believe it is unreasonable to expect that knowledge regarding osteoporosis 
may be correlated with other aspects of health knowledge, including the health effects 
of smoking.  The inclusion of this variable may also help to disentangle, to some 
extent at least, the mechanism whereby education affects smoking (see discussion 
above). 
                                                 
7 For a discussion on the relative importance of these mechanisms for the link between smoking, health 
and socio-economic status, see Meara (2001). 
8 In future research we hope to include other measures of health knowledge apart from osteoporosis.  
Nevertheless, osteoporisis may be a suitable measure of health knowledge for our sample since 
typically it is more common amongst older women thus reducing the chances that knowledge regarding 
it comes from direct experience but rather instead from being generally well-informed on health issues.  
Also since smoking increases the risk factor for osteoporosis it may be a good proxy for health 
knowledge specifically related to smoking.  14 
  The results in tables 2 and 3 confirm the importance of education as an 
explanatory factor in smoking behaviour.  The coefficient on the probit in table 2 for 
Leaving Cert is negative, indicating that compared to those having completed primary 
education, obtaining the Leaving Cert reduces the probability of becoming a smoker.  
Perhaps unusually, the coefficient on Junior Cert is positive.  Typically the 
relationship between the probability of smoking and educational achievement is 
monotonic (for example, see Madden, 2001) but the evidence here suggests otherwise.  
Curiously, the coefficient on those with third level education, while of the expected 
sign, is not significant.  The coefficient on third level education for the duration part 
of table 2 is positive but not significant.  A positive coefficient indicates that 
conditional upon eventually starting smoking, third level education will delay the 
process i.e. it has a positive effects upon the length of time before ￿failure￿, the 
transition to smoking.  Surprisingly, the coefficient on Leaving Cert is negative, 
though not significant.  Note also that the education variable here refers to the highest 
level achieved, a level which will not have been achieved by the subject for a number 
of the years at which she was at risk of starting smoking e.g. from age ten to twenty it 
is very unlikely that any person would have a third level degree.  However, if the 
highest level of education achieved acts as a proxy for a variable such as a person￿s 
discount rate (see the argument above) then its inclusion for all years at which the 
subject was at risk is valid. 
  For the most part, the coefficients on the duration part of table 2 are not 
significant.  One exception is the ban on radio advertising.  However, the sign of this 
coefficient is negative, contrary to intuition i.e. the ban on radio advertising shortened 
the duration before starting to smoke.  Another factor which is significant is health 
knowledge, and here the coefficient is of the expected sign.  Greater health knowledge 
increases the delay before starting smoking.  Turning now to the key factor we wish to 
examine in this paper, we see that for the split-population model the tax rate on 
tobacco has the ￿wrong￿ sign and is not statistically significant.  Thus for those 
people who will eventually smoke, the tax rate on tobacco has no effect upon the 
duration of time before they start smoking.  We also notice evidence of ￿heaping￿ in 
that the dummy variables for ten, fifteen and twenty years all have significant 
negative coefficients.  This indicates that with the retrospective data we have, people 
have a tendency to ￿round off￿ when they started smoking by indicating it was 
twenty, fifteen or ten years ago.  15 
  To allow for the possibility of a secular drift in smoking habits over time, 
perhaps related to increased health awareness or general public intolerance towards 
smoking we also include a time trend.  However, given that all the variation in tax 
rates is attributable to variation across calendar years there may be an identification 
problem in separating the time trend and tax effects.  Following Foster and Jones 
(2000) we thus include a fourth-order polynomial in time, which allows for a smooth 
but flexible time trend.  We also experiment with other specifications regarding time.  
These include a linear spline with three knots and in the third specification we simply 
exclude time altogether.  Finally, we also include a cohort dummy, which takes on a 
value of one if the individual is aged 33 or less. 
  The results in table 2 show that the estimates for the effect of taxation are 
quite sensitive to the specification for time.  When a linear spline is used, and when 
time is excluded altogether, the coefficient on tax is significant but not in the expected 
direction.  The coefficients on the other variables are all fairly robust to the 
specification for time.   
  Table 3 shows the results for the log-logistic model where the population is 
not split, and with the three different specifications for time.  Thus this approach 
assumes that at some stage every subject will ￿fail￿ and make the transition from non-
smoking to smoking.  The coefficients in this model are in general much better 
determined than in the split population model.  The effect of education is to lengthen 
the duration before smoking, with significant effects (of the same magnitude) 
observed for both the Leaving Cert and third level.  The coefficient on the ban on TV 
advertising is significant  when the fourth order polynomial is used but is insignificant 
elsewhere.  Once again the coefficient has the opposite sign to what intuition would 
suggest.  The coefficient on health knowledge once again has the expected sign for all 
specifications and is just off conventional significance levels (the p-value is about 
12%).  Interestingly, the inclusion of health knowledge reduces the size of the 
coefficients on education compared to the case where it is excluded (results not 
reported here but available on request), suggesting that at least part of the impact of 
education reflects knowledge regarding health.   The cohort effect is also significant, 
indicating that younger people (those aged 33 or less) started to smoke earlier than 
their older counterparts. 
  Marriage prolongs the duration before starting smoking, and perhaps most 
interestingly, so too does the tobacco tax for two of the specifications.  Since the  16 
dependent variable is actually the log of real tax on tobacco, the coefficient can be 
interpreted as an elasticity.  At first glance the estimated elasticities of 1.2 and 0.7 
appear high, but it is well to translate it into the metrics actually used.  An elasticity of 
about 1.2 suggests that an increase in the real tax on tobacco of five per cent (which 
would require an even bigger nominal tax increase, given some general inflation) 
would increase duration before smoking by about five to six per cent.   Given that the 
average value of the duration variable for those who eventually smoke is about nine 
years, this indicates a delay of around six to seven months following a five per cent 
real tax increase.  Once again there is evidence of heaping at five year intervals. 
  When using a parametric duration model it is important to determine whether 
the data support the particular parametric form of the hazard function.  Probably the 
most frequently employed method is to use the model based estimate of the 
cumulative hazard function to form what is known as the Cox-Snell (1968) residuals.  
The Cox-Snell residual for subject j at time  j t is defined as  ) ( ˆ ln ) ( ˆ
j j j j t S t H − = , the 
estimated cumulative hazard function obtained from the fitted model, given that 
) ( ˆ
j j t S  is the estimated survival function.  Cox and Snell argued that if we have n 
subjects then if the correct model has been fitted to the data, these residuals are n 
observations from an exponential distribution with unit mean.  Thus a plot of the 
model-based cumulative hazard against the cumulative hazard function obtained from  
a nonparametric or empirical estimator should yield a straight line with slope equal to 
one if the parametric model is correct. 
  Below we show such a plot for the log-logistic model for starting smoking. 
cum. Cox-Snell residual
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The departure of the plot from the reference line after the cumulative hazard takes 
on a value of about 0.37 gives some indication of misspecification.
9  The Ramsey 
RESET test however gives no indication of model misspecification with a p-value for 
the inclusion of higher powers of the fitted duration of 0.469.  Comparing the 
different specifications with regard to time, we see in table 3 that the RESET tests for 
the specifications with a linear spline and where we do not take account of time at all 
both show signs of misspecification.
10  Overall then it seems as though the 
specification with the fourth-order polynomial in time performs best, while the other 
two specifications perform relatively poorly.  
4.2 Quitting Smoking 
For the case of quitting smoking the analysis is in many ways the mirror image of 
the analysis reported above.  In this case the transition, or ￿failure￿ is the act of 
quitting smoking.  Thus a person who has smoked for say 10 years and then quits 
represents ten observations, where the duration variable increases by one each year.  
Each year up to the point of quitting is regarded as right-censored and then the 
quitting year is the transition year.  A person who say starts smoking in 1988 and has 
not quit by 1998 (the year of the survey) is simply treated as having ten right-censored 
observations.  We do not employ the split-population model for quitting since it seems 
more reasonable to assume that from a population of smokers, all, or at least a 
majority of them, will quit or would eventually quit if they could be observed for long 
enough, than to assume that from a population of non-smokers, all will eventually 
start smoking.  Below we show the plot of the empirical hazard function for quitting, 
once again using the lifetable estimate with confidence intervals. 
                                                 
9 From the graph it can be seen that the deviation from the reference line becomes severe at a value of 
the Cox-Snell residual of just over 1.0.  The cumulative hazard is then exp(-1) i.e. about 0.37. 
10 We do not present them here, but the graphs of the Cox-Snell residuals for the specifications with a 
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There are clear spikes at the ten and twenty year mark which suggests heaping.  
Apart from those spikes there is relatively little evidence of an increasing or 
decreasing hazard.  This suggests that amongst parametric duration models, the 
exponential or Weibull might be an appropriate choice.  The survival function for the 
exponential model (in accelerated failure time format) is:  ) exp( ) ( t t S λ − =  where 
) exp( β λ j j x − =  and  j x  and β  represent a vector of covariates and regression 
coefficients respectively.  The corresponding functions for the Weibull model is 
) ) ( exp( ) (
p t t S λ − =  where  ) / exp( p x j j β λ − =  and  j x  and β  are as before.  Clearly 
the exponential model is a special case of the Weibull model, where  1 = p .  We also 
include estimates from the generalised gamma model.  This is an extremely flexible 
model which nests both the exponential and Weibull model.  Its survival function is 












When  1 = κ  this reduces to the Weibull distribution, while  1 = κ  and  1 = σ  gives the 
exponential distribution. 
Tables 4-6 gives the results for the estimation of gamma, Weibull and 
exponential duration models (with the results presented in accelerated time format), 
where once again we have included different specifications of time.  Note that in 
terms of intuition, we expect coefficients to be of opposite sign to the starting models, 
since here we are estimating the effect of variables on the delay before quitting.  We 
note that there is very little to choose between the three models in terms of estimates  19 
of the non-tax coeffcients, with the possible exception of a larger effect for health 
knowledge in the exponential model.  Once again we see the importance of education.  
Compared to completing only primary education, having a Leaving Certificate or 
third level education exerts a statistically significant and negative impact on the delay 
before quitting.  Perhaps surprisingly the higher coefficient on health knowledge in 
the exponential model is not accompanied by a relatively smaller coefficient on 
education. 
The coefficient on the tax rate is of the expected sign in all three models when 
the fourth order polynomial in time is used and when no account is taken of time.  
When the linear spline is used the coefficient is not of the expected sign, but neither is 
it significant.  In fact only when the exponential model is used with no time trend is 
the coefficient statistically significant, with a value of ￿0.9.  However, in the Weibull 
and gamma models with no time trend, the coefficient on tax is not too far off 
conventional significance levels.  Given an elasticity of ￿0.9, since the average 
duration before quitting for those who quit is about 14 years, this suggests that a five 
per cent increase in the tax on tobacco would lead to a decrease in smoking duration 
of about seven to eight months. 
Surprisingly, the coefficients on the dummy variables for heaping are not 
significant, despite the plot of the empirical hazard function above.  In terms of nested 
tests, we note that the exponential model is rejected in favour of the Weibull (log p is 
significantly different from zero) and in turn the Weibull is rejected, though less 
decisively, in favour of the gamma (κ is not significantly different from unity except 
when no time trend is employed). The correspondence between the gamma and 
Weibull models is confirmed by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) which gives a 
marginally lower value to the Weibull compared to the gamma model, except once 
again when no time trend is used.
11  
This correspondence between the gamma and Weibull models and the 
difference compared to the exponential model is confirmed by examination of the 
Cox-Snell residuals for these models. Visual inspection indicates that the residuals for 
the gamma and Weibull models are very similar, while there is considerably greater 
deviance from the reference line in the case of the exponential model.  The results of 
                                                 
11 The AIC is typically used to discriminate between non-nested models and proposes penalizing the 
log likelihood function to reflect the number of parameters estimated in a particular model and then 
comparing them.  The model with the smallest AIC value is preferred.  20 
the Ramsey RESET test do not indicate misspecification with high p-values for both 
the Weibull and exponential models for the inclusion of higher powers of the fitted 
duration.  The gamma model with higher powers of the fitted duration would not 
solve owing to infeasible starting values, but given the p-value of 0.868 for the 
Weibull it seems highly likely that a similar figure would have been obtained for the 
gamma model.   
 
Cox-Snell Residuals for Gamma Model 
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Cox-Snell Residuals for Exponential Model 
   
cum. Cox-Snell residual





5.  Discussion and Conclusion 
This paper has examined the factors influencing starting and quitting smoking for 
a sample of Irish women using duration analysis.  The innovation in the paper is that 
retrospective data in the sample allows for the inclusion of the real tax on tobacco as a 
time-varying covariate, thus permitting analysis of the effectiveness of a major policy 
variable in terms of combating smoking.  The evidence presented here is mixed.  In 
terms of starting smoking, the results from a split population model appear to indicate 
either no role or else a highly counterintuitive role for tobacco taxes in starting 
quitting.  The evidence from a non-split log-logistic model suggested quite a 
considerable role for taxes in delaying duration before starting smoking.  The analysis 
for quitting showed that the effect of tobacco taxation was in the expected direction in 
terms of accelerating the quitting decision.  However in general this effect was not 
statistically significant.  One problem which featured in the analysis of quitting, and 
to a lesser extent starting, was the sensitivity of the influence of taxes to the treatment 
of time.  This suggests problems of identification and difficulty in discriminating 
between the effects of the variation over time in tax and the influence of other secular 
factors. 
Results for other variables were also of interest.  Predictably education played an 
important role, with higher lifetime educational achievement delaying the duration 
before starting and accelerating the duration before quitting.  The inclusion of a proxy 
for health knowledge tended to lower the coefficient on education indicating that part 
of the traditional role assigned to education reflects greater health knowledge among  22 
higher educated people.  The precise mechanism whereby education affects health 
behaviour and smoking in particular is something we hope to return to in future 
research.  Finally, the inclusion of variables reflecting advertising bans on tobacco 
produced results contrary to intuition with these variables either having no effect or 
else delaying the duration before starting smoking. 
Overall, the results in this paper are probably more suggestive than definitive in 
terms of the role of tobacco taxes in influencing starting and quitting.  It should also 
be borne in mind that the results here apply only to a sample of women aged 48 or 
under.  However, given the wealth of results from other countries and time periods 
regarding the effect of taxes and prices on tobacco consumption, it is clear that 
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Age  34.38265   
(8.697518) 
 
34.70977   
(8.701864) 
33.02846   
(8.511409) 
38.76471   
(7.806035) 
Age Started Smoking    19.35777   
(5.294379) 
 
19.37295   
(5.169976) 
19.31959   
(5.622771) 
Health Problem  .1038407    
(.305271) 
.1264368   
(.3328195) 
 
.1178862   
(.3231307) 
.1470588   
(.3559135) 
Single  .3499289   
(.4772868) 
.3390805   
(.4740788) 
 
.4065041   
(.4921821) 
.1764706   
(.3831026) 
Married  .5860597   
(.4928887) 
.591954   
(.4921794) 
 
.5284553   
(.5002074) 
.745098   
(.4379582) 
Widowed  .0085349   
(.0920547) 
.0057471   
(.0757005) 
 
  .0196078   
(.1393331) 
Separated  .0554765    
(.229071) 
.0632184   
(.2437058) 
 
.0650407   
(.2471003) 
.0588235   
(.2364561) 
Primary Education  .1052632   
(.3071107) 
.1293103   
(.3360263) 
 
.1463415   
(.3541688) 
.0882353   
(.2850375) 
Junior Cert  .2745377   
(.4465988) 
.3821839   
(.4866208) 
 
.4146341   
(.4936632) 
.3039216   
(.4622205) 
Leaving Cert  .4054054   
(.4913199) 
.3189655   
(.4667468) 
 
.2723577   
(.4460806) 
.4313725   
(.4977137) 
Third Level  .2147937   
(.4109716) 
.1695402   
(.3757687) 
 
.1666667   
(.3734378) 
.1764706   
(.3831026) 
Working  .5504979   
(.4977976) 
.4971264   
(.5007117) 
 
.4756098   
(.5004229) 
.5490196   
(.5000485) 
Cigarettes per Day    15.47977   
(8.827224) 
15.0449   
(8.063403) 
16.53465   
(10.42071) 
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Table 2: Split Population Duration Model for Starting Smoking 
 
  Duration  Probit  Duration Probit Duration Probit 
Junior  Cert  -0.014  0.318  -0.022 0.315 -0.113 0.269 
  (0.258)  (0.168)*  (0.260) (0.170)* (0.233) (0.156)* 
Leaving  Cert -0.330  -0.370  -0.345 -0.377 -0.288 -0.334 
  (0.258)  (0.156)**  (0.260) (0.158)** (0.236) (0.149)** 
Third  Level  0.348  -0.081  0.331 -0.083 0.202 -0.063 
  (0.287)  (0.180)  (0.291) (0.184) (0.271) (0.182) 
Ln  (Tax)  -0.933    -2.902  -1.217  
  (0.786)    (1.277)**   (0.286)***  
TV  Ban  -0.389    -0.636  -0.372  
  (0.274)    (0.282)**  (0.169)**  
Radio  Ban  -0.832    -0.829  -0.082  
  (0.321)***   (0.306)***   (0.127)  
Married  -0.207  -0.295  -0.215 -0.302 -0.162 -0.329 






0.355 0.002  0.357  0.004  0.243  -0.049 
 (0.203)*  (0.121)  (0.206)*  (0.123)  (0.184)  (0.122) 
Time  0.141        
  (0.227)        
Time^2/100  -2.836        
  (3.073)        
Time^3/1000  1.847        
  (1.438)        
Time 
^4/10000 
-0.343        
  (0.213)       
Time 1      -0.038       
     (0.060)     
Time 2      -0.015       
     (0.079)      
Time 3      0.330       
     (0.172)*     
Time 4      -0.579       
     (0.147)***     
5 Years  0.105    0.042    -0.760   
  (0.485)   (0.425)    (0.310)**   
10 Years  -1.143    -1.279    -0.583   
  (0.237)***    (0.248)***  (0.184)***  
15  Years  -0.485    -0.237  -0.176  
  (0.248)*    (0.257)  (0.198)  
20  Years  -1.616    -1.404  -1.205  
  (0.293)***    (0.277)***  (0.199)***  
Constant  2.838  -0.995  2.743 -0.982 2.776 -0.991 




Gamma  0.577    0.578  0.521  
  (0.049)***    (0.049)***  (0.043)***  




        
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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Table 3: Log-Logistic Duration Model for Starting Smoking (N=11733) 
 
Junior Cert  -0.232  -0.229  -0.225 
 (0.147)  (0.148)  (0.159) 
Leaving Cert  0.313  0.310  0.365 
 (0.150)**  (0.151)**  (0.162)** 
Third Level  0.301  0.290  0.362 
 (0.164)*  (0.166)*  (0.177)** 
ln(Tax) 1.171  0.802  0.699 
 (0.539)**  (0.983)  (0.257)*** 
TV Ban  -0.608  -0.418  0.257 
 (0.281)**  (0.273)  (0.194) 
Radio Ban  -0.419  -0.247  0.341 
 (0.314)  (0.291)  (0.160)** 
Married 0.239  0.257  0.268 
 (0.100)**  (0.100)**  (0.108)** 
Health Knowledge  0.186  0.195  0.191 
 (0.119)  (0.120)  (0.128) 
Young Cohort  -0.598  -0.620  -0.522 
 (0.129)***  (0.125)***  (0.137)*** 
Time -0.551     
 (0.217)**     
Time^2/100 7.366     
 (2.030)***     
Time^3/1000 -2.950     
 (0.724)***     
Time ^4/10000  0.374     
 (0.087)***     
Time 1    0.023   
   (0.047)   
Time 2    0.124   
   (0.074)*   
Time 3    -0.150   
   (0.130)   
Time 4    0.023   
   (0.070)   
5 Years  -0.566  -0.813  -0.823 
 (0.257)**  (0.247)***  (0.270)*** 
10 Years  -0.945  -0.981  -1.075 
 (0.184)***  (0.193)***  (0.186)*** 
15 Years  -0.735  -0.535  -0.595 
 (0.213)***  (0.220)**  (0.193)*** 
20 Years  -1.336  -1.344  -0.853 
 (0.257)***  (0.260)***  (0.181)*** 
Constant 3.898  2.569  2.764 
 (0.820)***  (0.422)***  (0.233)*** 
Gamma 0.596  0.595  0.632 
  (0.036)*** (0.036)***  (0.037)*** 
RESET (Wald p) 0.469  0.002  0.000 
* significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 
1% 
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Table 4: Gamma Models for Quitting (AFT format, N=8625) 
Junior Cert  -0.138  -0.135  -0.136 
 (0.152)  (0.157)  (0.158) 
Leaving Cert  -0.492  -0.491  -0.491 
 (0.158)***  (0.161)***  (0.153)*** 
Third Level  -0.793  -0.796  -0.794 
 (0.213)***  (0.377)**  (0.281)*** 
ln(Tax) -0.187  1.126  -0.570 
 (0.698)  (1.172)  (0.360) 
TV Ban  0.132  0.151  -0.048 
 (0.451)  (0.424)  (0.231) 
Radio Ban  0.341  0.432  0.133 
 (0.370)  (0.387)  (0.195) 
Married -0.103  -0.099  -0.104 
 (0.126)  (0.125)  (0.125) 
Health Knowledge  -0.551  -0.546  -0.545 
 (0.215)**  (0.252)**  (0.231)** 
Young Cohort  0.063  0.065  0.040 
 (0.229)  (0.329)  (0.229) 
Time 0.056     
 (0.123)     
Time^2/100 -0.494     
 (1.639)     
Time^3/1000 0.117    
 (0.678)     
Time ^4/10000  -0.009     
 (0.087)     
Time 1    0.018   
   (0.047)   
Time 2    0.041   
   (0.122)   
Time 3    -0.203   
   (0.177)   
Time 4    0.116   
   (0.076)   
5 Years  0.365  0.348  0.342 
 (0.489)  (0.327)  (0.319) 
10 Years  0.535  0.617  0.545 
 (0.374)  (0.418)  (0.383) 
15 Years  -0.356  -0.532  -0.292 
 (0.300)  (0.377)  (0.280) 
20 Years  0.573  0.453  0.409 
 (0.548)  (0.754)  (0.546) 
Constant 4.095  4.472  4.124 
 (0.417)***  (0.446)***  (0.314)*** 
Ln(σ) -0.161  -0.155  -0.162 
  (0.066)** (0.402)  (0.299) 
κ 0.640  0.622  0.632 
  n/a (0.813)  (0.442) 
Log Likelihood  -421.416  -420.455  -421.733 
AIC 880.832  878.91  873.466 
RESET (Wald p) n/a  n/a  n/a 
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%;  
***significant at 1%      28 
 
Table 5: Weibull Models for Quitting (AFT format, N=8625) 
Junior Cert  -0.159  -0.159  -0.159 
 (0.148)  (0.148)  (0.147) 
Leaving Cert  -0.473  -0.473  -0.472 
 (0.143)***  (0.143)***  (0.143)*** 
Third Level  -0.694  -0.693  -0.695 
 (0.195)***  (0.195)***  (0.195)*** 
ln(Tax) -0.214  0.915  -0.458 
 (0.643)  (1.012)  (0.311) 
TV Ban  0.173  0.189  -0.005 
 (0.413)  (0.367)  (0.216) 
Radio Ban  0.359  0.446  0.120 
 (0.364)  (0.367)  (0.189) 
Married -0.100  -0.098  -0.100 
 (0.119)  (0.119)  (0.118) 
Health Knowledge  -0.590  -0.590  -0.588 
 (0.213)***  (0.213)***  (0.213)*** 
Young Cohort  0.001  -0.005  -0.009 
 (0.220)  (0.220)  (0.214) 
Time 0.077     
 (0.112)     
Time^2/100 -0.789     
 (1.501)     
Time^3/1000 0.233    
 (0.617)     
Time ^4/10000  -0.022     
 (0.079)     
Time 1    0.022   
   (0.044)   
Time 2    0.016   
   (0.094)   
Time 3    -0.162   
   (0.137)   
Time 4    0.108   
   (0.070)   
5 Years  0.336  0.325  0.323 
 (0.303)  (0.297)  (0.296) 
10 Years  0.475  0.545  0.464 
 (0.370)  (0.373)  (0.361) 
15 Years  -0.296  -0.454  -0.256 
 (0.269)  (0.285)  (0.244) 
20 Years  0.681  0.598  0.521 
 (0.547)  (0.565)  (0.515) 
Constant 4.124  4.480  4.233 
 (0.393)***  (0.440)***  (0.262)*** 
 Ln(p)  0.342  0.344  0.346 
  (0.067)*** (0.067)*** (0.066)*** 
Log Likelihood  -422.122  -421.195  -422.483 
AIC 880.244  878.39  874.966 
RESET (Wald p) 0.868  0.750 0.781 
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
    29 
 
Table 6: Exponential Model for Quitting (AFT format) 
Junior Cert  -0.061  -0.061  -0.062 
 (0.196)  (0.196)  (0.195) 
Leaving Cert  -0.496  -0.496  -0.497 
 (0.188)***  (0.188)***  (0.189)*** 
Third Level  -0.703  -0.703  -0.708 
 (0.248)***  (0.247)***  (0.247)*** 
ln(Tax) -0.471  1.001  -0.900 
 (0.910)  (1.441)  (0.402)** 
TV Ban  0.194  0.236  -0.154 
 (0.573)  (0.522)  (0.299) 
Radio Ban  0.536  0.683  0.113 
 (0.517)  (0.521)  (0.265) 
Married -0.153  -0.150  -0.150 
 (0.153)  (0.153)  (0.153) 
Health Knowledge  -0.849  -0.849  -0.845 
 (0.294)***  (0.294)***  (0.294)*** 
Time 0.135     
 (0.156)     
Time^2/100 -1.464     
 (2.116)     
Time^3/1000 0.457    
 (0.873)     
Time ^4/10000  -0.047     
 (0.112)     
Time 1    0.035   
   (0.061)   
Time 2    -0.012   
   (0.133)   
Time 3    -0.196   
   (0.193)   
Time 4    0.148   
   (0.099)   
5 Years  0.479  0.471  0.466 
 (0.427)  (0.419)  (0.418) 
10 Years  0.718  0.818  0.711 
 (0.518)  (0.523)  (0.506) 
15 Years  -0.384  -0.598  -0.320 
 (0.375)  (0.396)  (0.346) 
20 Years  1.070  0.997  0.779 
 (0.781)  (0.808)  (0.732) 
Constant 4.501  4.988  4.668 
 (0.542)***  (0.610)***  (0.368)*** 
Log Likelihood  -434.570  -433.698  -435.099 
AIC 903.14  901.396  896.198 
RESET (Wald p) 0.740  0.600 0.836 
Observations      
Robust standard errors 
in parentheses 
   
* significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1% 
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